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It turns out that if you’re in the top 15% by TEs in any one season, as both O’Conor and Hassell-Collins were, the most likely outcome is a drop of at least 15% the following season. Just 23% of the elites improve by at least 15% with 13% staying stable, 45% declining, and 20% are absent the following year (either through injury or moving to a non-Prem club). Even at its lowest in 2023-24 to 2024-25 a full 52% of elite carriers saw a decline in their production from the season before.

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Even if we look at players with at least 10 TEs and see what happens in the following three seasons, 54% have shown an overall decrease in performance. In some ways this is to expected. If you’re one of the best in the league you have less room to improve into. But, it’s worth remembering that we’re not talking about the top three or four players in the league. In 2021-22 this top 15% was 47 players. But, what if you could know who was going to improve the next year?

It turns out we can start to do that. And this is where things get fun. We can split our players into two types; Volume and Efficiency players. Our Volume players are in the top 33% by total TEs and the top 50% by minutes played. Our Efficiency players are in the top 33% by TEs per carry with at least 10 carries. The Efficiency players 26.3% of the time versus 19.2% for the Volume players and a similar gap is seen when looking at the number who decline with the Efficiency cohort 9 points lower. All this suggests that the most likely players to improve are those who have done a lot with a small sample size. But is that why they improve or is it because they’re just younger?

We can do this by looking only at wingers and fullbacks. Remember, we’re looking at whether their output increases or not the following season. The picture is fairly clear with players consistently improving through age 23 before decline takes over. As they reach their late 20s not only is decline more likely but absence also thins the herd with more than 50% of players not featuring the following year after age 31.

There are two parts to this; improvement and raw results. For example, a player who declines by 16% from 30 TEs is a better value player than someone who improved by 20% from 10 TEs. While our young uns are busy improving, they’re not yet hitting their straps. That happens at 23 and generally sustains until 27. The decline after 30 by TEs is not as stark as we saw in the other graph. The reason for this is that if a player has made it through to 31 they’re likely to be a very good winger even if they’re declining.

What does this tell us? Firstly, a good pick-up is someone young who has shown bursts of talent in a small sample size. After all, they have a greater chance of improving. Secondly, don’t pay someone expecting them to deliver what they did the year before. It’s much more likely that they will decline than stay equal or improve. Even if you’re giving them a three-year contract, it’s still more likely that they will have declined over that time. Thirdly, on that point, it’s a particularly bad idea to pay someone in their late 20s who is coming off the season of their life. Their chances of sustaining that are incredibly slim. But, there’s nothing wrong with picking an older player. While they are more likely to decline, they’ll be declining from a higher level and can usually be acquired more cheaply.

Isn’t that useful to know?

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Way back in September you might remember that I posted a breakout XV. I set myself the rules of having 5,000 minutes to ‘use’ from the 2024-25 season to select fifteen players who I felt were on the verge of exploding this season.

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Squad: 15. Noah Heward (Bristol Bears), 14. George Hendy (Northampton Saints), 13. Will Wand (Leicester Tigers), 12. Sammy Arnold (Newcastle Red Bulls), 11. Alex Wills (Sale Sharks), 10. Will Haydon-Wood (Exeter Chiefs), 9. Caolan Englefield (Gloucester), 1. Tarek Haffar (Northampton Saints), 2. Ollie Fletcher (Newcastle Red Bull), 3. James Harper (Sale Sharks), 4. Tom Manz (Leicester Tigers), 5. Harry Wilson (Saracens), 6. Arthur Green (Bath), 7. Martin Moloney (Exeter Chiefs), 8. Fyn Brown (Northampton Saints)

The good news is that this team played 6,333 minutes in the Prem this season, 2,207 more than the previous season. Eight of the fifteen played more minutes this season than last. Let’s look at who I got right first of all.

Big Movers

The four big movers were Will Wand (844 more mins this season vs last), James Harper (603 more), George Hendy (531 more), and Noah Heward (515 more). The spike from Wand is the fourth largest jump among players who featured both this year and last. I said of Wand, “I think Wand will be a starting outside centre the season after this, maybe not with Leicester.” I was to conservative with this prediction as Wand turned into the Tigers’ starter this year. He scored 13 tries in 29 matches including a brace in the Premiership Rugby Cup Final in March. This built on his debut Tigers’ season where he scored seven in eleven matches after joining from Coventry. He was dominant for Coventry and is fully deserving of his time in the spotlight.

Heward scored more tries this year than in any previous season and made the most after limited opportunities before Christmas. Rich Lane is off next season though Tobi Wilson is joining from Ealing so don’t expect a similar increase for Heward next year. Hendy scored in bunches with his eighteen tries coming in just eleven game with four against Bristol in that massacre in May. He should and I’m sure will get more opportunities next year and an England call up is on the horizon. The same may also be true for Harper who managed to steal the starting role from Asher Opoku for vast stretches and even pushed his younger teammate across to the other side of the scrum.

Mid-Pack

Caolan Englefield (361mins more), Alex Wills (262mins), Ollie Fletcher (164mins), and Harry Wilson (43mins) added a marginal amount more playing time this season. Englefield and new Gloucester addition Mike Austin split time behind Tomos Williams when the Welshman was available but both had enough time in the driving seat. Williams is off but Dan Robson is coming in so expect more time share duties for the duo. Last year Wills split time between Sale and Caldy, this year he was with Sale the whole time and came away with six tries in 19 total appearances, a decent if not exceptional return for the winger. Fletcher spent most of the year in a deputy role which got him into 28 games in total. It’s all change at Newcastle though as three hookers are out the door but George McGuigan (who started the vast majority of games) is staying and George Turner is arriving. Things won’t get easier for Fletcher to get game time next year. Wilson didn’t make much of a step forward this year but he’s off to Exeter who are losing two locks which might open the door for more gametime.

Misses

Arthur Green (26 minutes less), Sammy Arnold (130mins), Tom Manz (140mins), Fyn Brown (157mins), Tarek Haffar (196mins), Will Haydon-Wood (201mins), and Martin Moloney (266mins) all saw their playing time go backwards.

Green was hammering on the door all season. He scored ten in fourteen matches but the departure of Alfie Barbeary to Saracens means Green should see a lot more action this year and would make this list in a heartbeat if I do it again for this season. Arnold missed chunks of the start of the season and though he was present for the second half he’s going to have a lot more competition next year as Newcastle flash the cash. Things didn’t work out for Manz this year and he once more split time between Nottingham and Welford Road. With both George Martin and Harry Wells off he has the potential to get more game time.

Fyn Brown was exceptional for Bedford Blues but saw very limited action for Northampton. I still believe he’s a great talent but he will be leaving the Saints this off-season. Haffar made good progress by turning out three times for Ireland A even if he minutes dropped. Nicky Smith is off next year and although Mako Vunipola is arriving, expect to see more of Haffar. Haydon-Wood was unlucky that Harvey Skinner was in the form of his life and started thirty of thirty matches. Haydon-Wood still appeared in 27 matches and if Skinner is injured or Exeter spread their resources around he’ll be in line to significantly increase his minutes. It never quite clicked for Moloney this year as he was trusted in the Premiership Rugby Cup but didn’t get any Prem minutes. He is off during the off-season to, as yet, unknown pastures but don’t be surprised if he’s picked up by an Irish province.

Hindsight

Will Wand turned out to be my best pick but there were some big opportunities I missed out on. Bryn Bradley of Harlequins saw a boatload of actions this year after featuring for just 23 minutes last year. He might well be in the hunt for a Welsh jersey this season. Charlie Bracken also put himself on the International radar with 656 additional minutes this time around. Finally, Will Hobson went from 14 minutes last season as he spent most of his time with London Scottish to 654 this year. Yet more evidence, if it were needed, that the Champ really is the Proving Ground.

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Using the excellent Oval Insights data we can create a basic but effective Expected Points (xPTS) model based purely on 22-Entries Difference. If your 22-entries difference was greater than +5 you get awarded 4 xPTS, if it’s between +2 and +5 you get 3 xPTS, +2 to -2 is 2 xPTS, -2 to -5 is 1 xPTS, anything worse than that is 0 xPTS. You’ll note that we don’t have bonus points here so when we compare our xPTS to the real world we are comparing them to ‘True Points’ those are 4pts for a win, 2 for a draw, 0 for a loss.

Let’s start by looking at the Prem this season. Three of the play-off teams are at the top of our xPTS table. Bath and Leicester Tigers far outstrip the competition and you can see that just 6 xPTS cover third to Exeter Chiefs in eighth. If you are wondering what is going on here, it’s important to note that both Northampton Saints and Exeter Chiefs won two games when the xPTS model would’ve suggested they should have received 0pts. In the case of Exeter those games were a 27-26 win versus Sale Sharks in November when they had six entries to eleven for Sale and a 38-14 victory over Newcastle Red Bulls when the Red Bulls had 14 entries and Exeter had just eight. Sale Sharks on the other hand got 0 True Points from five games where the xPTS model said they should have received 12 PTS.

All in though I am happy with what we are seeing. It’s showing us interesting results without completely overturning what really happened. If you are working on something like this and the results don’t chime with the real world then double check everything.

We can look at what happened in the Champ, a season with more games where theoretically we should see less volatility. Unsurprisingly, Ealing remain top of the charts, the only game they played all season with fewer xPTS thought they would lose was their narrow 34-33 win against eventual victors Worcester Warriors where they had ten (!!) fewer 22-entries than the Warrior’s 19. Elsewhere, there is some concern for Bedford Blues who over performed their xPTS by 15pts, though their xPTS total was still enough to suggest they were not lucky to make the play-offs. Chinnor also under performed their xPTS, as did Cambridge by a remarkable 26pts!

Again, the Top 14 has plenty of games so we see less volatility with the exception of Racing 92, who enormously out performed their xPTS and La Rochelle, who ‘should’ have finished second. Racing beat Perpignan, Pau, Bordeaux, and Toulouse when their 22-entry difference was at least five worse than their opponents. They also won four of the five games with a 22-entry difference of between +2 and 0. Is that sustainable? We’ll discuss that later. La Rochelle on the other hand were rarely bad, just two games had 0 xPTS (and they lost them both) but they also lost five of the eight games where their 22-entry difference was between +2 and -2. They also lost two of the twelve games where they were expected to get 4 PTS.

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Finally, the URC. The top four are clearly ahead of everyone based on both types of points but we should have our eye drawn to the bottom right and the Scarlets. Both they are the Dragons have 20 True PTS, so what is different for them? The Scarlets are an odd choice. They have dominated very few games, they’ve not had more than a +5 22-entry difference. But, the seven games with a positive 22-entry difference should have yielded 22pts but instead they brought just six; a win against Zebre and a draw against the Dragons. Meanwhile, there were three matches where xPTS gave them 0 PTS, they won two of them. One was a 27-22 victory over Ulster when dealing with a -9 22-entry difference and the other was an absurd 21-17 victory over Cardiff when dealing with a -17!! difference. Of the 79 games with a 22-difference of -10 or worse, just six were won. This was the only one of 34 games where a team had a 22-difference of worse than -13 and won.

We can how much a team over performed their xPTS per game in this graph. A team like Northampton Saints, 1.3pts per game more than their xPTS would suggest whereas Sale Sharks lost 1.1pts per game compared to their xPTS. The question is whether this is a skill.

Let’s consider something like kicking at goal. That is a skill, so you’d expect that a good player last year would be a good player this year. It’s not a coin flip where one year Jonny Wilkinson is great, the next he misses everything, the next he’s fine, the next he is bad, the next he’s amazing etc. The key is understanding if something is a skill or if it’s random. The question is whether being able to out perform your xPTS is a skill (and equally if under performing it is something you can consistently do). The answer is that I don’t yet know but it seems highly unlikely.

To understand why, let’s break down what 22-entries is actually covering. It looks just at your 22-entries and your opponent’s 22-entries. You might say that therefore an incredibly efficient team might be able to score a load of points on their own entries and limit the opposition on theirs. That’s true to a point, a good side would score more points on their entries than the opposition. But, to out perform your xPTS you need to be both efficient on your entries but also not very good at limiting the opposition at getting entries which is a curious and unlikely combination of skills. More likely, you are getting lucky. That’s an ugly word I know, but luck plays a massive part in sport. Were Sale Sharks a better team than Exeter Chiefs this year? On the face of it, that is a totally mad thing to say given that the difference in the league table was 29pts. So is there any logic in it?

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Let’s start by removing 9pts from that difference that have come from bonus points and we are therefore removing from our measurements. So Exeter are 20pts better still in the league. There were eleven games between the two teams which had an xPTS of three or more; five for Sale and six for Exeter. Sale’s xPTS from these games was 20 PTS and they came away with 16 PTS. Exeter’s xPTS from these games was 21 PTS and they came away with 16 PTS. In the games they were meant to win, they were more or less just as good as one another.

Between the two teams there were 14 matches with an xPTS of 1 or zero; seven for each team. Sale were expected to come away with 3 PTS from these games but came away with 0 and Exeter were expected to come away with 2 PTS but instead came away with ten. One conclusion you might reach is that therefore Exeter are just better at winning games when the chips are down. There is some evidence to suggest that, last year they got 8 PTS from their nine matches last season where they had an xPTS of one or less (they were expected to get four points from those matches). Though, on the flip side, they were much worse at winning games they should win. There were six matches with an xPTS of 3 or more (totaling 22 xPTS) and they won just eight actual points from them.

If you feel you’ve got lost in the numbers, here is a quick summary. While it is tempting to believe that teams can either win games they aren’t expected to win or win games they are expected to win, there isn’t any evidence to show that. The real skill is limiting the number of games where you’re not expected to win. Which basically means having a positive 22-entry difference as often as you can. And, if your True Points is out performing your xPTS significantly, then be aware about what might happen next season. Unless you improve then expect lady luck to be less favourable to you next time.

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The gap between average carry metres and average carry % is 11.8% and that is our benchmark. For example, a team who carries wide 30% of the time but makes 33% of their metres from these wide carries is significantly under-performing. It’s not just good enough to have a higher carry metre % out wide, you need to out-perform 11.8%. So who does?

The top five are listed above and are led by Ulster who out-perform their opportunities by 17.5% (39.6% wide carries and 57.1% metres made from wide carries). Note that we are talking about percentages here, so these teams might still be relatively bad at gaining metres out wide but they are at least better relatively than they are at gaining metres through the middle.

Incidentally, the worst teams are; Vannes (6.1%), Coventry (7.2%), and the Sharks (9.2%). These three should go wide less often and Ulster, Dragons etc should do it more often?

Let’s take three teams; Munster, Toulouse, and the Sharks. Remember that expected gap, 11.8%:

• Munster - Wide Carry % = 38.8%, Gap = 16.5%

• Toulouse - Wide Carry % = 39.0%, Gap = 13.8%

• Sharks - Wide Carry % = 38.9%, Gap = 9.2%

All three teams go wide more or less as often as one another but their outcomes are wildly different. Munster probably should carry wider more often because it is so successful whereas the Sharks don’t get enough joy from their wide carrying. Remember, the average is around 30% so all are above the average anyway. In general, the more you carry wide the better, marginally, you get at it. Marginally, but crucially you don’t become predictable it appears.

This flips when looking at winger carries. As you would expect, wingers carry wide a lot more than teams as a whole; 65% of carries are wide and 72% of metres are made from those wide carries. That means wingers under-perform the 11.8% average we were discussing earlier. This makes sense, there is ultimately a law of diminishing returns.

Every league fails to hit that 11.8% benchmark but there are six teams who surpass it from the 70:

1. Valence-Romans: +14.2%

2. Munster: +14%

3. Northampton: +14%

4. Perpignan: +13.6%

5. Bordeaux: +13%

6. Carcassonne: +11.9%

These teams should consider going wider more often with their wingers, Munster do it just 61% of the time despite getting 75% of their carry metres from it. On the other end of the spectrum, a team like Caldy go wide 75.8% of the time despite only getting 77.8% of total metres from those wide carries. That still means they out-perform based on on the percentages alone but they under-perform our benchmark and should look at how they use their wingers out wide and if it is more beneficial to go through the middle.

So should teams go wide? Well the answer, as hopefully tell, is that it depends and it’s much more interesting than you might initially think. The key is to understand where you rank compared to your rivals and whether you are getting enough mileage from your wide carries. Only then will you know if you are out-performing or not.

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The same is true in rugby and this long read will hopefully breakdown the kind of things I look out for when I’m watching a game.

The first thing to note is that I am not suggesting you watch every game with a notepad and serious expression on your face. It’s entertainment and it’s meant to be fun. Most games I watch are surface entertainment. However, I am a nause and so I enjoy picking apart what I am watching. I suspect you might be as well, so join me on this trip.

On TV

Most rugby we watch will be on TV. That makes it easier to watch in some ways; replays, different angles, and zoomed in footage but harder to see the bigger tactical picture. Here are three tips for watching on TV.

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1. Look for the Unusual

This is how I started getting interested in analysis. Watch the game as usual but pay attention to anything that looks odd. This is deliberately vague. This might be something at the scrum or lineout - maybe a back being involved or a forward being pushed out into the midfield. But it might also be something more subtle, perhaps a team are playing particularly tight to the previous ruck or they’re playing exceptionally wide. Just watch and something unusual will leap out at you.

I watched Welsh second division team Bedwas, live but the point applies, and saw them attacking in an unusually expansive manner. I didn’t know exactly what I was seeing but it struck me as unusual. I spoke with their coach who explained they were playing a 2-4-2 and were trying to play each phase in a different horizontal segment of the pitch (they split the pitch into three).

So what you may be asking. Well, as a fan it improved my watching experience because I was seeing something new. If you enjoy films, you can get a lot out of a well made but unoriginal film but a well made original film gets the blood pumping. As a coach it made me rethink how I see the game. That’s a lot of benefit from a game I paid £10 to watch.

I would encourage you to be childlike when you watch games. Adults don’t ask enough questions because we don’t want people to think we’re thick. But have that internal monologue with yourself where you ask why something is happening. From the kick-off, why has that team kicked the ball to that location? Are they targeting a specific player? Why? Are they targeting a specific part of the pitch? Why? That can be your mindset on the first kick-off, then the second kick-off can refine that. “Okay I see they’ve targeted that same player even though he’s now in a different part of the pitch” - who is the player? Is he a good carrier or a bad carrier? If he’s a good carrier, why would they be targeting him with a kick? Maybe it’s so he can’t be used on a later phase when play is less organised? If you’ve got that far in your reasoning then you’re opening up a whole swathe of different questions which go well beyond kick-offs alone and will mean you watch open play in a completely different way.

2. First Three Phases

Generally, attacks will plan the first three phases off both lineout and scrum. Knowing that this is planned helps you to see what an attack is trying to do For example, do they hit tight and then try and go around the corner or do they try and play with width on the first phase? If they play with width off first phase, what do they try and do on the second phase? Seeing what a team is trying to do is a great way of understanding the game because it highlights the ambition a team has, understand that and suddenly the entire game becomes more interesting to watch. Why don’t all teams take the same approach? Now you’re thinking like an analyst.

Make sure you take a look at the defence as well. The defence don’t know what the attack will do which puts them on the back foot but they aren’t under the fatigue pressure which comes as the phases ramp up. What do they do with that preparation? Do they blast off the line or soak up the pressure? Do they allow the attack to go wide or do they cut them off? If you can see this then you can start finding the weaknesses in the defence which the attack are trying to exploit.

3. Scoring Tries

There’s more to rugby than tries. In fact, tries are fairly uncommon so if you’re only looking at tries you’re missing a lot of the other detail that happens in the game. As you learn to watch the game better you will discover the other parts of the sport that matter, but for now let’s focus on the tries as we always get replays of those.

Very rarely does a try come simply from an exceptional individual effort or defensive error. Instead, it’s a building of pressure or a succession of good decisions. Look initially at what happens off the ball. Does anyone make a run which opens up space? Did anyone deliver a perfect pass? The try scorer might have made a nice step but what happened before then to allow them the space to make the step? If you can see what leads to tries then you can see what leads to clean breaks.

In the Stadium

In the stadium, the things that become easier to see are width and depth and individual player actions. Let’s explain those two.

1. Width and Depth

Understanding width and depth is hard to do until you see it in-person. Width refers to how wide a team is trying to play. We would usually expect to see one player stuck on each winger but it won’t always be the winger. Look to see if they literally have their toes on the paint or if they’re pulling infield a bit. Look as well to see who is sent out wide, is it a back or a forward? If it’s a forward, have a look for where the winger is.

Once you understand the basics, have a look at whether the amount of width and who provides it changes depending on where they are on the pitch. Some teams will play with less width in the opposition 22 as they look to overpower their opponents in the middle.

When we’re talking about depth we are looking at how far behind the ball the attackers stand. We might have been used to seeing a constant sloping line away from the ball as kids but that’s not the case anymore. Some teams will play very flat (i.e. close to where the ball is) whereas others will stand deep. Some have the first receiver deep then everyone else flat. Look at what each of these approaches gives the attack and what it prevents.

2. Watching Players

There was a film released in 2006 which just followed Zinedine Zidane as he played a La Liga match against Villarreal. I’m not suggesting you do that but it is helpful to just watch a single player perhaps for an attacking possession or a few minutes. If you want to understand what a back row does, the best way is to just watch them. Where do they go? What rucks do they hit and what don’t they? How do they involve themselves in the game via carries? It’s not possible to do that on TV but it’s easy in-person.

By following these steps not only will you become more knowledgeable about the game, you will just enjoy it more. Like with everything, understanding the moving parts gives you so much insight into what is really going on. Enjoy the process!

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The logic of this is fairly simple, if there is no relegation then anyone who isn’t going to make the play-offs can basically down tools at the end of the season because there is nothing left to play for. Of course, the teams at the top still have to keep going because they have a shot at a title. Whereas in a league with both a championship and relegation, only the small group of teams in the middle might pack it in early.

Overall, we can see that there is a difference between the number of blowouts at the start of the season and at the end.

The number of games decided by 30+ points increases by 50.4% between the start of the season and the final three months. This dataset is providing by the excellent Oval Insights and looks at the last three seasons in the Prem, Champ, URC, Top 14, and Pro D2. All bar the URC have relegation though no relegation has actually taken place in the Prem during that period.

Here we can look at the changes in blowout matches (30pts+) between the start of the season and the end of the season. Remember, a 100% change would be going from say 5 blowout matches to 10 blowout matches. This change is looking at the % change so it takes into account the fact there are fewer matches in the latter part of the season.

The average league sees a 50% increase in blowout games at the end of the season with the Champ (82%) a particular outlier. But what about Top 14 (23%) and Pro D2 (37%), they are noticeably lower on the scale. One obvious suggestion as to why that is would be relegation. Both leagues have relegation and the Pro D2 has promotion. In the Pro D2 and Top 14 eight of the teams end up in either the promotion play-offs or relegation play-offs.

At the other end of things, the Champ theoretically had promotion in the seasons we measured but the teams in contention have never been eligible and now were any teams relegated. In addition, there was no promotion or relegation play-offs during this period which meant that by the turn of the year most teams had very little to play for. Thankfully that has now changed and the Champ format this year is producing sensational and meaningful matches right to the final weekend. I’m also involved in the coverage and you can watch exclusively on Clubber TV.

Let’s look at the Prem in more detail:

Consistently we see the % of blowouts increases in the dying months of the season. As we’ve seen, that isn’t unusual and certainly isn’t unique to the Prem. It is also good news to see that the increase in blowouts has been less severe in the two most recent seasons compared to the two previous. Though, it’s also worth stating that at 30% the blowout rate this season is the highest in the reporting.

There are a few things to note in this. The first is that we might be being misled slightly by some high-profile recent blowout games which are skewing our views about the Prem. The second is that even in leagues with theoretical relegation, like the Prem, the removal of relegation as a realistic option early in the season will create conditions for blowouts to thrive. For a few seasons, Doncaster were the only team with a plausible route to the Prem but they had been out of title contention by January or February.

It’s easy to conclude that removing relegation removes meaningful games from the end of the season. But that doesn’t tell the whole story. The Champ during this period had a 29% blowout rate in the late season, higher than any other league. As we’ve seen, it didn’t have realistic promotion or relegation but then nor did the URC and that only had a 16.7% blowout rate, the joint lowest. The URC didn’t even have the potential for promotion or relegation.

What did the URC have? Well, it has eight play-off spots meaning more teams are in contention for something for longer. The Champ had no play-off spots and one potential relegation spot. For an extensive period of the season, most teams had nothing to fight for. The key, is tournament make-up and this is what both the Pro D2 and Top 14 found. Yes, they have promotion and relegation which is helpful but the extensive play-off spots are arguably more helpful.

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This is a balance. If you had a ten team league and the top eight went into a play-off and the bottom two went into a relegation two-legged battle then everyone would always have something to fight for. That should reduce the blowouts but it risks destroying the integrity of the league stage as there’s almost no point in doing well for most of the season. The balance is probably to give half of your teams some kind of play-off or alternatively a meaningful alternative prize; European football in the Premier League for example. The URC does this well whereas the Prem essentially eliminates just a single team from Champions Cup (theoretically the relegated team would be replaced by a Champ side).

Now this is a serious point. I am not in favour of a closed shop league but that’s clearly the route the Prem want to go. If they are to do that then immediately you remove the relegation dogfight. It’s possible to chuck a season down the drain and your only punishment is Challenge Cup rugby. There’s no getting around that in a closed shop league. If you don’t bring in more play-off spots then you will end up in a situation like this year where only six teams have a chance at the title. Next week that might drop to five with three games left to play. That isn’t conducive to a watch. So, if the threat of relegation goes and there’s no increase in play-off rugby then expect the blowout rate to quickly get out of control.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

Waterstones: https://www.waterstones.com/book/attacking-the-space/sam-larner/mike-prendergast/9781399625098

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We can see the shift in win success rates in our table below for the four teams we have chosen:

Let’s pick apart our risers for now and see what they have done better this year compared to last, using the excellent Oval Insights data. Interestingly, neither has seen enormous shifts in their abilities to reach the opposition 22. Northampton have gone from 12.33 visits per game to 12.50 and Exeter have gone from 10.11 to 10.57. These are not big shifts but they have been combined with an increased efficiency when they have arrived in the opposition 22. For Exeter 52% of their entries last season ended with a try or penalty won, that is now 56%. For Northampton the difference is even greater, going from 45% to 60%. All in, Northampton now score an additional 10.32pts from their 22-entries in this season and for Exeter it’s an additional 5.57pts.

These changes are striking but as we’ve mentioned, they’re also expected. It’s not surprising that a team with good results has done that with an uptick in 22-entries. Entries are just an extension of tries, what we need to know is why they now had more 22-entries.

One way to look at this is in a metric I created called Positive Possession Outcome (PPO). This is the percentage of possessions which ended with either a try scored or a penalty won minus the possessions which end with a penalty conceded or a turnover. But specifically we’re going to look at the middle third of the pitch, the area which ultimately drives 22-entries. Last year, the PPO for Northampton Saints in the middle third was -5.3% raising to +4.9% this time around. For Exeter it was -8% last year rising to +2% now. This change has come from a few different shifts. Firstly, both teams score more tries from these situations than they did last year; 10.6% vs 6% for Saints and 7.9% vs 5.8% for Exeter. They also have marginal fewer possessions ending in a turnover in these positions; 34.4% vs 36.6% last year for Saints and 38.1% vs 39.6% for Chiefs. The rest of the difference has come from a marginal increase in penalties won.

This is an important point to flag. If we believe that 22-entries are critical, and they are, then the key to winning more is to have more of them. But that starts in the middle of the pitch. If you win possessions which take place in the middle of the pitch, then you give yourself more chances to run or kick (from a penalty) into the opposition 22. Plus, you give your competitors fewer chances to do the same to you. The per-game 22-entry difference in 2024-25 for Saints was +0.75 (that is, they had 0.75 22-entries more per game than their opponents). For Chiefs it was -0.67. In 2025-26 those differences are +0.93 Saints and +0.21 Chiefs. Therefore the swing is +0.18 Saints and +0.88 for Chiefs.

Those differences may sound small, and they are, but assuming 2.8pts per entry that represents a points difference of 9pts for Saints and 44pts for Chiefs. Then there are the knock-on impacts of giving your opponents’ fewer gilt edge chances and the impacts that come from winning the midfield battles. It forces your opponents to constantly be alert and put huge effort into defending.

A word of caution for Chiefs fans though, their current allowed points per 22-entry is an unsustainable 1.81pts, that is 0.2pts lower than any other teams in the last two seasons. If that flips, then they probably are not a play-off team.

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On the fallers side, both Gloucester and Quins are scoring 0.5pts less per 22-entry this season compared to last. Quins have a similar number of entries but Gloucester’s are 1.46 per game lower. These are frightening numbers for both sides. The drop in efficiency is bad enough but when combined with a collapse in the number of entries it’s crippling.

Both ranked 15th or worse in the twenty teams who have played in the last two years of the Prem when looking at midfield PPO. Gloucester’s is -7.3% worse than everyone bar the Chiefs last year and Newcastle this time around. Both sides have actually reduced the percentage of possessions which end in a turnover, but that’s not necessarily good news because they’ve swapped them for penalties conceded and have fewer positive outcomes than they did last year. They’ve also both gone backwards at the lineout with Quins going from 7th highest lineout success to 18th highest. That is triggered by a shift away from throwing to the front; they threw to the front the second most of anyone last year but that is a notoriously difficult place to attack from.

You can see how this slide happens, both positively and negatively. It’s not that one thing crashes or suddenly rises. It’s that a succession of small things build, one on top of the other. This is challenging for coaches because you can’t simply fix one thing and get an instant result, instead you have to fix a succession of small issues which all have knock-on impacts with other seemingly unrelated factors. It’s complicated….in short.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

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The first thing we can easily see is how Pollock is used as a carrier. For Northampton, he looks like a regular forward, just a very good version of a regular forward. He makes the big carries in the middle of the pitch using his footwork and pace to gain the advantage rather than carrying power. We can put numbers on this in two ways, the first is we can split the field into five equal segments across the pitch. For Northampton he has made 73.2% of his carries in the middle three sections of the pitch this season, for England the total is 61.7% with a high number of those carries coming on the right, just not quite the extreme right. We can also look at the type of carries he makes; for the Saints 51.8% are either drives or pick and goes. A drive is a carry made off nine and a pick and go is obviously a carry made from the ruck without a pass. For England the number is 32.3%. That is reflected in his metres per carry, for England it is 1.1m further than the 4.6m he achieves for Saints.

We know there are differences, but a better question is to ask whether one side uses him better than the other. He is more involved for Saints than for England, he makes 11.3 carries for the Prem side per 80 minutes and just 9.6 for England. It is true that Saints carry more, but even as a % of the team’s total, Pollock carries more for Saints than England.

First up, it is harder to carry in the midfield than out wide. Backrowers in the Prem get 50% more value from wide carries than from midfield carries by Try Equivalents. Northampton are the best team when looking at these wide carries. Midfield backrow carries in the Six Nations are even less rewarding than in the Prem. That makes life difficult for a smaller player who doesn’t have the space in International rugby he does in the club game. For context, in the Six Nations backrowers making carries in the midfield have to beat 8.7 defenders per clean break, in the Prem it’s just 4.8.

Moving Pollock to the edges for England undeniably makes his carrying more effective. But there is certainly an argument that it doesn’t make him more valuable for England. By moving him out to the wing more often you lose the effectiveness of a quick footed forward who can skip round bigger forwards. This is where the game is probably going. Charlie Morgan wrote an excellent article exploring the idea of the next hole attack. This is where attackers try and draw a defender towards them before popping the ball into a looping attackers’ arms to go through that ‘next hole’. Pollock’s speed makes him perfect for this role because he can run off the shoulder of a scrum-half and hit a gap close to the ruck to then use his power to win the collision. Or, he can do the same thing but further away from the ruck and into the space. Or, he can contribute out wide and go through an overlap. Northampton use him in all these roles whereas England only use him in some.

But, it’s too easy to suggest that this shows a lack of creativity or an overly pragmatic edge. That is often a criticism of Borthwick’s England. It’s assumed that if only England played like Northampton, the results would be different. However, there are many ways to skin a cat and it’s not clear that moving to bringing Pollock into the midfield would actually be all that beneficial. I think it probably would be, but at the International level his skillset is suited to the role he currently has and will probably evolve to fulfill the role he fills at Northampton.

So in short, Pollock does a different role for England than for Northampton and that means he is a little less involved for country than for club. While England are probably wise not to go full Saints, they should nonetheless look at some of the detail that Sam Vesty is bringing in on attack. The way that Pollock moves around the pitch with freedom means that he can pop-up in the most effective places. Though, there are knock-on impacts that come from that and we will explore them in a later post.

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James Cherry, Nottingham, Back Row

With 20 try involvements, Cherry leads all the forwards in the Champ. His 17 tries are the second most behind only Dean Adamson, the Bedford winger. But Cherry isn’t just of value because of his try scoring, he is a talismanic leader for the Archers. In their mud bath match-up against Worcester Warriors he led the way with endless carries and tackles. He also joined in with the above try that allowed Nottingham to ease clear.

Lucas Titherington, Bedford Blues, Centre

The Blues have had an exceptional season and find themselves in prime position to get a home Champ semi-final in the play-offs. One of the core reasons for this has been the unit of fly-half Will Maisey, inside centre Michael Le Bourgeois, and outside centre Titherington. Maisey will appear later on in our list but Titherington deserves his spot for his work on both sides of the ball. In their latest match against Worcester Warriors he was incredible defensively especially when he hauled down Siva Naulago as he broke through the Bedford line. One week before he’d unlocked the Cornish Pirates with a wonderful line picked out by Maisey. He has scored ‘only’ five tries but the Expected Tries model suggests he should have had nine which puts him eighth in the league.

Ed Timpson, Cambridge, Back Row

Cambridge haven’t been great but they would have been much much worse were it not for the performances of Ed Timpson. The back rower has 43.3% dominant carries, the most, and tenth most dominant carries. He sandwiched his Champ performances in between spells in the MLR for first RFCLA and latterly California Legion. He is someone who should be in the sights of many URC and Prem teams once he’s done with the Legion.

Josh Bainbridge, Doncaster Knights, Back Row

The back rower has been excellent defensively all season for a Knights team who have been up and down and struggled to stitch together runs of form. Bainbridge has made 29 dominant tackles, the second most in the league and the 18th most tackles despite only tipping over the 1,000mins mark in his last match against Richmond. He also got his second try for the season in that fixture. Picked out by Cornish Pirates coach Joe Walsh as one of the best defenders in the league.

Morgan Strong, Coventry, Back Row

The Welshman is the only player with more than 300 carries and the only forward with more than 200 passes. He is showing how the game is moving but at a vastly accelerated rate. He’s already scored ten tries, more than the eight he managed last year. Coventry have Cambridge at home, Cornish Pirates away, and Worcester at home in their final three games of the regular season. They are guaranteed a play-off spot but will probably need to go away in the semi-finals for a shot at the final. Strong will be integral to that run-in.

Tomiwa Agbongbon, Cornish Pirates, Back Row

The fourth most carries in the league and almost 1 in 4 have been dominant. Agbongbon has been an integral part of Cornish’s play-off push. The back rower isn’t just a big ball carrier though, he works tirelessly at ruck time and more than contributes in one of the best lineouts in the league. Cornish are, at present, in the final play-off spot but they are under pressure from Hartpury and Nottingham and will face Hartpury in their final game which is primed to be a barnstormer.

Jamie Campbell, Chinnor, Second Row

The massive second-row has been an integral part of a Chinnor side who are currently sat in the play-off positions. Campbell has received more lineout ball than anyone else and he has hit 135 more rucks than the second placed Jake Monson of Richmond. He’s the best in the league at the unseen work and he backs that up with brilliance in the seen work, as above, as well. One to watch as he’s still only 24.

Will Maisey, Bedford Blues, Fly-Half

Maisey has scored 181pts this season, second in the league, with four tries. He leads the league with 32 assisted breaks, two via kick. Perhaps most crucial is to watch games where he is not involved - he has only failed to start in two matches this season. One was against Cambridge where he came on after 50 minutes and Bedford promptly scored three tries and came from nine points down. The other was against Nottingham where he didn’t feature at all and Bedford scored their lowest points total of the season, 10.

Zach Kerr, Doncaster Knights, Centre/Wing

The Irishman has played in every single match this season for the Knights and has made 32 clean breaks, second only to Dean Adamson of Bedford. While naturally a centre, he’s stepped onto the wing when needed and formed a great partnership with Tongan international Telusa Vaeinu. His ten expected tries match nicely with his nine ‘actual’ tries and he is certainly one to watch in the next season or two as he looks to carry this form into the new season where Doncaster will look to go again at the play-offs.

Kieran Wilkinson, Caldy, Fly-Half

It’s perhaps unsurprising that the ex-Prem player has had such an impact but he has been absolutely critical for Caldy. The Caldy charge has been stunted with losses to Cornish Pirates, Worcester, Bedford, Chinnor, Ealing, and Coventry as they have had one of the hardest possible runs. But, they had 17pts more at the 22 game mark than they had at the same point last year and are clear of the relegation zone. Wilkinson has assisted 30 breaks, the second most, and beaten 48 defenders as he’s pulled the strings and carried Caldy to a much better year than they had last season.

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In this opening clip we talk about how Worcester rose from the ashes and what it really means to have a cohesive team.

In the second clip we talked about passing and how forwards, and particularly flankers, have to be able to contribute with ball in hand like backs.

In the third clip we looked at passing within a pod and the evolution of the four man forward pod.

In the final clip we looked at how you can target the blindside and how you can still make a positive carry even with a slow start.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

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In the excellent Attack, Attack, Attack! by Alan and AB Zondagh they talk about the benefits of two players playing in tandem. Note how Tom Jordan and Noah Heward (the eventual try scorer) work in tandem with one another. As they drift across the pitch they also drift through the responsibilities of different defenders. Heward, by working alongside Jordan can choose where he joins the line. In this case Jordan gets through the gap which allows Heward to stay in play and then hold his run to get on the end of the pass for the try.

Again, look for the tandem players. They operate as a single unit with the hindmost attacker able to identify where and when to target the line. By drifting across the pitch they are also able to change the set-up and overload the attack. At four seconds Leicester have five against five Gloucester defenders. At nine seconds they have four against three because the two attackers have slide around the corner and the defence can’t just follow them because there are hard runners fixing the tight defenders. This then comes down to work rate. If you are able to get across the pitch and then be fit enough to do something useful when you get there, then you will out work a defence.

You can see the influence a curved run has even if that player doesn’t get the ball. Look how Aaron Reed makes a run from the far side of the pitch to the midfield. If you are asking why the wide Northampton defender doesn’t just charge across the pitch and cover Tom O’Flaherty, it’s because he is pinned down by that curving run. The effort from Reed could result in him getting a simple pass and going in under the sticks. Without that effort and that curved run, Sale don’t have another attacker and this try probably doesn’t happen or if it does it’s a lower percentage chance.

Something I try and bring into my coaching is the idea that the best way to attack is to give defenders a chance to miss a tackle. If I run at you full pace but in a straight line then you should make that tackle. That’s not to say it’s an easy tackle but you should at least slow me down even if I run over the top of you. But, if I suddenly emerge in your channel after sliding around the back of another attacker then I give you a legitimate excuse not to make the tackle. If I attack the space between two defenders then I allow both of them to justify a missed tackle by saying they thought the other defender had it. In this example, look how Tommy O’Brien curves around and then emerges out the back of the attack. He is then attacking the inside shoulder of a defender who thinks he’s going to be making a tackle with his outside shoulder. O’Brien has allowed the tackle to be missed.

Finally, look at how the curved run can create space even without seeing the ball. Note how the curving runner lures out the wider defender and disconnects them from the rest of the defensive line. As that happens it opens up space on the inside for Izaia Perese to target the space. Imagine this attack without the curving runner. It might still be effective but it puts a lot of pressure on Perese to open up the hole by himself. That curving runner means that there is more window dressing and therefore more pressure on the defence.

Conclusion

I have talked a lot in the past about the skill of getting second touches. If you can get a second touch on the ball then you are likely to be getting a second touch on your way to a try. In this case, very few of these curved runners are getting second touches but the effect is the same. They were in one place and now they have got across the pitch to attack in a second position. What do the defence do? If they try and chase the curving runner across the pitch they leave themselves at risk of an attacker going against the grain and picking off the space on the inside shoulder of the defence.

But, this isn’t just about running sideways. Notice how when curving runners finally get the ball they need to straighten up and run forwards. If you keep going sideways once you have possession then you risk doing everything we were told not to do as kids.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

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It’s worth comparing miss passes and crossfield kicks, the overwhelming source of kick tries. Miss passes received a bad rap because, unless they are perfectly thrown, the ball takes time to get wide. In that time, the defence can usually get across and close down the wide threat. Of course, if you pass the ball through the hands it will take longer to get wide but you can fix defenders and create that space. The cross kick is the same. Unless the kick is flat it will simply take too long to get there and the defence can get across.

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The solution? The most obvious is to flatten and speed up the kick. This development has been genuinely transformational. It’s the same type of improvement which saw back of the hand offloads go from unseen highlight reels to things which happen all the time and nobody comments on. The other factor is kicking early as soon as you have tightened up the defence. We can see that in this example.

Notice how Racing have tightened up the Vannes defence and also have two forwards defending in the widest positions. They could now try and pass but instead Antoine Gibert backs himself to get that kick over to Cameron Woki. This kick has a high margin of error because of the two defensive forwards. But look how Woki is calling for the ball early. He immediately sees that the space is there and there is a connection across the team that the cross kick is on - not as a high-risk party trick but as a standard way of attacking.

The way that players have upskilled themselves has significantly reduced the risk as well. You would almost never have seen this kick previously because the risk was too high and you would have felt it wasn’t necessary and instead you could’ve gone through the hands. But the quality of kicking now means this is simple and has less risk than going through the hands. Matthieu Jalibert doesn’t need a perfect kick under pressure, he ‘just’ needs to land it in the empty space with a bit of backspin and his attackers will always win the race.

In both these examples, the kick is to where the defenders aren’t. That relies upon the attack to have narrowed the defence to create the space to kick into. In the past this was still a great attacking opportunity but one where you’d more commonly see a string of passes. Instead this is like the long ball game in football where the middlemen are removed and the risk they might make a mistake is removed with them.

It is also possible to kick where the defenders are. That doesn’t require quite as much accuracy as first appears. Kicking at a defender forces them to stay where they are and allows your attacker to go after the ball wherever it ends up. As you can see here, the defender has much less space to cover to get to the ball but also less vision of where the kick will go. That leaves them floundering as the attacker targets the ball. Of course there is risk, a floated ball gives the defender time to track the flight and time to create a run-up. With all 15 attackers committed to the cause, those kicks can result in pick-7s in the other direction.

Conclusion

Roger Bannister broke the four minute mile in 1954. Within 46 days John Landy had also broken the barrier and set a quicker time. Within three years 16 men had beaten it. Now over 1,400 men have broken that mark. This isn’t an original observation I know. Everyone knows the story of how Bannister made it possible and then something that took years to do suddenly tumbled at regular intervals. I don’t think I saw a single cross kick in my ten or so years as a youth rugby player. I’m pretty sure I didn’t see any in my first three years of grassroots rugby. Now they are a fairly common, if not often successful, feature in those levels. At the elite level they are leading to breaks or tries virtually every game. The question is how do you stop them? The answer is…well nobody really knows yet. France spent the Six Nations telling everyone what they would do, did it, and nobody stopped them. It’s not the element of surprise that’s the challenge, it’s that the quality of kicks has improved to such a level that it doesn’t seem possible to stop. But there will be a solution found eventually. It’s just that as soon as there is, something we haven’t yet seen will come in and give defence coaches yet more sleepless nights.

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Using the excellent Oval Insights data, we can see there are clear differences in the baseline numbers between Rounds 1 & 2 and 3 & 4:

These differences are stark. Metres per Carry and Expected Tries have almost halved, Passes per Ruck dropped by a third, and DB/CB more than doubled. This combination of figures has led to a team being beaten by an enormous margin to one hanging in the fight. So why has each changed?

Metres per Carry

Against Wales, 77 of Ireland’s carries gained exactly 0m - 41%. Just 33 gained 5m or more. The key was doubling up on the hit. You can see how first James Botham pairs up with fly-half Dan Edwards to fell Stuart McCloskey. The next phase it’s Eddie James who makes the initial hit and is then supported by lock Ben Carter. There are a few things to like about this from a Welsh perspective. You can measure this but look at how long it is between James making contact with Jack Conan and the backrower finally getting put to deck. I make it five seconds, that’s five seconds where the rest of the Welsh defence can recover and set themselves for the next phase.

When the hit is made, both Josh Adam and Joe Hawkins are the closest defenders but they don’t go in to double up on the tackle. If they did that they’d leave Aaron Wainwright and Dewi Lake to fold to the far side and be outmatched by quicker Irish backs. Instead, James is left to make the hit alone until it comes into the centre where Carter can double up without leaving a hole. Look at the discipline of Rhys Carré who has no interest in the tackle at all and simply looks for his next job on the following phase. This was a fantastic performance from Wales and much improved from the France game where they were run around so often.

Expected Tries & DB/CBs

As you all know, those xTs come from metres made, defenders beaten, clean breaks, and tries. But that doesn’t tell the whole picture. Ireland beat 32 Welsh defenders, that was the same total as France achieved. But the difference is France generated 28 line breaks to just seven for Ireland. Against France, almost every half chance resulted in a full crippling line break but against Ireland they could bend without breaking. That meant their DB/CB was four times higher against Ireland, a sign that Wales were making life harder for their opposition.

Across the tournament the average has been 2.5 by DB/CB and Wales’ loss against France (1.1) the worst all competition. Despite facing 188 carries, Wales gave up just seven clean breaks and were able to quickly mop up the broken tackles that did happen because they successfully spread their defensive resources across the pitch. Which takes us to passes per ruck…

Passes per Ruck

This was a metric I devised in 2019 alongside Simon Gleave when we were working on the World Cup in Tokyo. The idea was simple, if you knew how many passes a team made per ruck you would know if they were playing an expansive or conservative game. Across the tournament, the average is 1.7 and the peak is 2.5 for France against Wales, the lowest 1.2 for Wales against England.

We can see how narrow the Welsh defence are here, that encourages more passes per ruck as France see the width and can attack it.

Now compare that to the Ireland game. Ireland have created a nice attacking platform where they have two sides of attack which naturally reduces the nearside defenders Wales can deploy. But, look how they aren’t enticing Ireland to play wide. Two passes gets them into the teeth of Botham and Alex Mann and so they go tight and kick on the next phase. This has been a sensational shift for Wales as their narrow defence was an obvious area to exploit. That they have fixed this within a few weeks is testament to the hard work of the Welsh coaching team.

Conclusion

There are still areas where improvements are needed. Wales haven’t kept their opponents under 11 22-entries so far and they’ve allowed more than 2pts per entry in every match. That of course is a problem for a side who are struggling to break the 20pt barrier themselves. They have also found it hard to generate turnovers. They’ve made just 25 (fourth most) despite making 922 tackles, by 63 the most. These are quite significant challenges, but they are but nothing compared to the whole suite of challenges they had after those horror opening two weeks and that is good news for Welsh people everywhere!

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What do I mean when I say that? Well the French back row at this Six Nations, according to the excellent Oval Insights data, have the lowest gain line success rate (36.4%) and the fewest carries over the gain line (20). For context, Ireland lead with a 58.7% gain line success rate from their back row. Look across the whole set of forwards and France are second worst (36.3%) and have the second lowest carries over the gain line (57). It’s not just the gain line, the French back row have the lowest defenders beaten and joint lowest clean breaks.

Are they….bad?

Unsurprisingly, my answer to this would be no. France’s back row predominantly operate as all court operators. They can carry well enough, they link-up play well (second most passes behind Ireland), and they have a higher rate of dominant tackles than anyone else. They are fully embracing the role of a modern back row who can do everything pretty well and some things exceptionally. The French aren’t the biggest carriers but everything else they do is top drawer.

There is another part to this though; France don’t really have the powerful back rows they might need to change this. Across the past two seasons, the only Frenchman in the top ten in the Top 14 by carries across the gain line is Gregory Alldritt. The other nine are Jack Willis, Billy Vunipola, Abraham Papalii, Beka Gorgadze, Rodrigo Bruni, Sione Kalamafoni, Pita Sowakula, Uzair Cassiem, and Facunda Isa. There are twice the number of ex-Scarlets as French players.

Eleventh on that list is Lenni Nouchi of Montpellier who has been involved in the opening three matches of the Six Nations. He might well be the future and he should be. He combines dynamism with heft and power and at just 22-years-old he’s got plenty of time to build into the side. The best case scenario for France is they can slot in a player like Nouchi and add defence bending gain line carries to what is already an elite back row.

Beyond the French focus, their back row shows that the old fashioned understanding of roles is out of date. It’s okay to have a few linking back rows or elite defenders or tireless workers if you have others in your fifteen who can do the big carrying. It’s why a player like Ellis Genge is so important to England. He allows a quicker back row to go to work without worrying they leave the team underpowered. That is explained excellently by James While in Planet Rugby. If you have brilliant players, play them and then fix their ‘weaknesses’ elsewhere.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

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Let’s start by saying just how unlikely it is to achieve a 3.6pts per 22-entry. Across 233 teams in the Six Nations, URC, Prem, or Top14 to have had at least 30 22-entries in their first six games just two have had more than 3.5pts per entry; England 2025 and Leinster 2020-21. Just 47 of the 233 teams in that list had a number less than the 1.8pts England have managed this year. No team in the last six years of the Six Nations has had more unsuccessful 22-entries than England this year, France this year are the only other team to top 20 unsuccessful entries.

Part of the explanation is that we need to remember just how unsustainable last year’s 3.6pts per 22-entry is. But, that still leaves us with 1.8pts this year which is worryingly low.

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First, not all 22-entries are created equally. For England, 58% (26 entries beginning outside of the 22 is second only to France) of their 22-entries have come from possessions which started outside the opposition 22. Those 22-entries have resulted in tries 19% of the time - the fourth highest ahead of only Italy (15%) and Wales (8%). Their points per 22-entry is ahead of only Wales and Italy for those entries.

Not that things get much better when they start in the opposition 22. In that case they score 2.2pts per entry which is behind everyone bar Italy. However, they generate 19 total entries which means they tie level with Ireland with 42 total points from their 22-entries starting in the 22.

Where England really suffer is in getting in and getting out. For 22-entries that last 0-2 phases, England come away with just 2.4pts per entry, the lowest in the Six Nations. For 3-7 phases England are good but points per entry drops off as the phase count increases. They score 1.8pts per entry on those entries which is behind only Ireland (1.9pts). For entries with more than eight phases they fall away again to 0.6pts per entry, the third highest.

This will be anathema to many England fans, but one of the reasons for this is that England are overplaying in the 22. Their forced and unforced turnovers in the opposition 22 top the table. That is coming from an expansive 22 attack. Only two teams have fewer than 60% of their carries in the opposition 22 tight to the ruck (pick and goes and one out carries). They are France (58.4%) and England (48%). That 48% is the lowest of the 30 teams over the last five years of Six Nations rugby. You can see that from the game on Saturday where England went through 18 phases then a loose pass from George Ford to Ellis Genge resulted in a knock-on and turnover ball.

The good news is that England are creating a huge amount of opportunities. As with a striker, you worry when they stop having chances not when they stop scoring. They have scored 81pts from their 22-entries, the second highest in the tournament. The problem is that France have one more 22-entry yet 42pts more. At the moment, England fans should be heartened. The 3.6pts per entry from last year is unsustainable and the 1.8pts per entry for this year are probably unsustainable as well. If they can split the difference (2.7pts) and keep the same high rate of entries then they’re more than a match for France.

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First of all, let me just say that Scotland were sensationally good on Saturday. They were accurate, they out thought England, and they won in all the areas where many believed England would have the upper hand. We will need to see whether this was their Everest or whether the Italian result was actually the abomination. However, the reaction to England’s loss has been hard to fathom.

This was Sir Clive Woodward’s reaction. He is not alone though, the most common thing I saw post-match on Twitter was frustration at the amount of kicking. It’s worth saying at this point that England kicked less than Scotland (26 v 28) - they kicked 42 times last weekend against Wales.

That is a long running issue with rugby. I was in the stadium in Cardiff on Sunday and there was a lot of moaning around me about the Welsh kicking. And it was bad. But it was bad because it was too long and allowed France to immediately run it back for significant gain. That wasn’t what the moaning was about though, it was about the fact that Wales were kicking at all - rather than continuing to running into the blue wall. For most fans, running into the opposition and getting nowhere is preferable to doing something smarter. But if you’re reading this, you’re not most fans, so lets look in more detail.

Kick to Pass ratio (as outlined on Rugby Pass) is a good way of understanding how expansive a team were. If you kick 40 times it might mean you had loads of possession or maybe you kicked literally everything away, we don’t know without knowing how many passes were made per kick.

What we have seen is a steady climb in Kick to Pass Ratio (number on the vertical axis is passes per kick) since the start of the 2023 Rugby World Cup. If we remove the non-Tier One oppositions then it is even clearer.

England were an extremely pragmatic team but they aren’t that anymore. Anything over four in the passes per kick ratio puts you among the more expansive teams in International rugby. Not only that, but on Saturday George Ford (the Aussie Rules kicker) passed 32 times to 21 for Finn Russell.

England should be criticised when they lose. They have vast resources and a very strong playing pool and so of course should win more often than they lose and constantly be Six Nations contenders. Plus, against Scotland they were bad and outplayed so of course criticism is incoming. But I think that criticism has to be based on reality. If you think England kick relentlessly then what level of kicking are you willing to accept? If it’s not 26 then what is it? And if that lack of kicking comes with a lack of creativity then is that a price worth paying?

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I was at the match in Cardiff yesterday and I was left with a feeling that didn’t seem to be matched by either my companions or the rest of the crowd, I was struggling to see reasons for optimism. So I decided to write down my thoughts and see if anything of note comes up.

Garbage Time

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Against France, Wales were more than 14pts behind after 14 minutes. It was 18 minutes versus England and 30 versus South Africa. Against New Zealand it wasn’t until minute 58 that Wales were effectively out of the game. In all three of their most recent matches, the result has been decided before half-time in two before the first quarter was up. That does change how we should analyse the Welsh performance. Against France they drew the second quarter 7-7 and against England they drew the third quarter 7-7. There are reasons for optimism in both those passages of play but of course the performance of England and France has been changed by the fact they are already victorious. Yesterday, France clearly began throwing more 50/50 offloads and playing in a devil may care manner in that second quarter which allowed Wales back in.

In both the most recent Six Nations matches the quarter following the ‘good’ Welsh quarter was a 12-0 loss versus England and a 28-0 loss versus France. This was reminiscent of New Zealand games of past where the All Blacks would be matched by their opponent for an hour of the 80 minutes but all the damage was done in the remaining 20 minutes. I remember speaking to an analyst for Namibia in 2019 who said that the biggest work-on was making sure they stayed focused all the way through to the half. If they played 35 minutes instead of 40 the result could go from respectable to embarrassing. In the 2026 Six Nations, Wales have stitched together one good half from two games of rugby but even that best half would’ve had them drawing 14-14, not winning. That also changes the watching experience, I am not expecting Welsh victories against England or France at present but I am expecting them to stay in the fight at least until the hour mark.

This should temper our hope as Welsh fans. It is a big step from being good for 20 minutes to being good for 60 minutes to being good for 80 minutes and beginning to sniff out wins once more.

Naivety

The first step to winning matches is to make yourself hard to beat. That requires relentless accuracy, intent, urgency, and tactical awareness to ensure that a team who are better than you are don’t get gifted easy tries. To do this, you have to understand where teams are trying to exploit you and plug them while the match is ongoing.

This is the first box kick of the game and leads to the first try of the game. The kick is a good one and allows Ellis Mee to compete with Louis Bielle-Biarrey in the air. But Bielle-Biarrey wins and slaps it back to Thomas Ramos who instantly realises he has a 2v1 against Eddie James with teammate Emilien Gailleton. Gailleton realises he is probably running into a trap so turns infield and gets France on the front foot. They will immediately spread the ball wide then score two phases later.

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What do we see? We see an intent from France to attack the short side after a box kick. We see a winger competing and Thomas Ramos stood behind with vision of where to attack and we see two players either side waiting to be fed. There is clear intent and Wales will be hurt if they don’t continue to cover that threat.

Let’s look at the next box kick for Wales. This one is long with limited hang time but we have Mee chasing the kick with Alex Mann on the inside and Dewi Lake on the outside. Without watching the video you may already spot the issue. In the first case, Wales got away with it because they had Eddie James and Aaron Wainwright able to move laterally to cover. That’s a back and a mobile forward. Between them they just about manage to shut down the issue and pass it off to the inside defence.

In this case, because the kick is too long the pass to the outside is easier and it lets Bielle-Biarrey have a one v one against Lake in an 8m channel. A battle he obviously wins.

What follows is almost an exact replica of the first try where France spread the ball wide to look for gaps and this time they are successful. That is the two punch knock-out. First win the aerial battle and attack the short side, pull the defence over then spread the ball wide and hit the short edge and then run into space. Wales already had a warning about this on the first box kick, remember this is the second box kick of the game. The third one is a good long kick to touch from Williams, the fourth one is this.

This kick is better, it’s contestable again but either side of Mee is Rhys Carré and Olly Cracknell. But Mee can’t stop the first pass and as soon as that happens France are in their natural territory and simply pick off the forwards who are in space defending some of the most exciting players in World rugby.

Reminder, Wales have been caught out tree times by exactly the same thing. They’ve varied the length of kick but none of it has worked and they haven’t learnt. Which has taken the game away from them as they have conceded two tries from this. That was after a game against England where the aerial game was seen as a major weakness. There are things that could have been done though. Eventually they kicked very very short, which wasn’t hugely helpful but at least stopped this from happening. They also limited this kind of counter attack when Dan Edwards kicked, though again that didn’t pose too many problems for France either. Alternatively, they could have added another chaser onto the short side. That would have removed someone from the open side but would have plugged up the holes that France exploited. They could have adjusted how hard Mee chased the kick. In two of the above examples he got there quickly enough to contest the kick but didn’t win it and that removed him as a defender. Telling him not to compete but chase then slow would at least have kept him in the defensive line, even if it was exceptionally passive as a strategy. There were options.

Conclusion

This has been the challenge with Wales of late. I had no expectations that they would beat England or France but I was hopeful that they would stay in the game until the hour mark. Against France I didn’t think the Welsh back three could compete with the French back three in a man to man battle but I did think they could slow them down at least. It’s not really good enough to throw your arms in the air and say you were beaten by a better team. Every tier one team is better than Wales at the moment so to get back to respectability requires them to beat teams better than they are.

Look at Scotland on the weekend. They removed a strength England had and made it harder for them to win. They backed that up by being excellent across the park but even if they weren’t, they still would have made it harder for England to win. That is what Wales need to do against Scotland. They need to end the game with the feeling that they made Scotland work, that made them think how to plot a way to beat Wales. In recent matches there’s not a sense that anyone has ended a match against Wales thinking that. That also starts by being competitive in the first twenty minutes and not giving up the victory before some of the fans have even taken a seat.

Did you enjoy this? If so, I have a book out called Attacking the Space, you can get it in any bookshop or follow the links below:

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Moment One: 10.21 Irish Lineout (Score: 0-0)

Ireland have an opportunity to launch an attack from just inside the Irish half. They win the lineout and play into the midfield with the aim to get to the outside of the wide set French defence. Garry Ringrose ends up with the ball and has Jamie Osbourne (15) on a hard line, Stuart McCloskey (12) out the back with Tommy O’Brien (14) further stacked behind. But the French defence get up too quickly and Ringrose is sacked behind the gainline. Things then breakdown and Dan Sheehan (2) carries by himself on the far side and Jamison Gibson-Park (9) box kicks it away.

The kick is good and Jacob Stockdale (11) competes in the air but ultimately the scraps fall to France and Théo Attissogbe. France go a couple of phases then Antoine Dupont kicks a speculative chip which Ireland win and now have a transition attack about 35m from the French line. The ball is slow to emerge and when it does Sam Prendergast (10) gives a pass to Tadhg Beirne (5) which is bobbled and lost forward. Attissogbe immediately flips the field with a kick from the outside of his boot. From here, Ireland are fighting a losing battle.

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Osbourne kicks the ball back but it needs to go to touch and instead stays in the field of play. The Irish defenders are trapped on the far side of the pitch and Louis Bielle-Biarrey is screaming for Thomas Ramos to hit the cross kick. Instead, the fullback keeps ball in hand and carries back. They are further out than Ireland were for their transition attack and the ruck is also slow but France have used this time to get back into their structure.

Mickaël Guillard carries into a two man tackle but the combined work of Jean-Baptiste Gros and Charles Ollivon gets the attack moving forward. Now there is a bit of space and Dupont passes to Mathieu Jalibert who steps up to the right then rakes a kick to the left. Prendergast is out of position and left to scamper after the kick to prevent a 50:22. He volleys it downfield but it also stays in play. Nicolas Depoortère, Ramos, Yoram Moefana, and finally Bielle-Biarrey combine to finish it off.

Start to finish, that ‘moment’ is two minutes. But we have two meaningful attacking possessions for each team. For Ireland we have the lineout and the transition attack after the Dupont kick, for France it’s the two possessions started when Ireland couldn’t get their kicks off the pitch. Of course for France the first of those two possessions led directly to the second one. There was a valiant attempt by Prendergast to keep the ball in play but that spectacular kick is the punishment for initially being out of position. Which was a factor throughout the match. Ireland were out of position and France had the kicking variety to continue to exploit those positional problems.

Moment Two: 18.20 French Lineout (Score: 7-0)

Gibson-Park has done a great job reading the French attack and his pressure leads to a fumble which leads to Attissogbe under pressure and eventually a French lineout. Julien Marchand and Dupont combine to win the lineout then France get a penalty after a carry by the hooker. Dupont goes quickly.

What follows is a masterclass in carrying, support, and options. Jalibert receives the first pass after the initial ruck and he has Marchand running a hard inside line but he could also get it to Dorian Aldegheri on his outside shoulder. Then it’s Moefana who has Cros on the inside, Depoorteré on the outside, and Jalibert behind. He does almost a full 360 and passes it to Jalibert. Then it’s Oscar Jegou who has Cros on his inside (the prop has tracked play right the way across the pitch) and Antony Jelonch omn his outside. But Jegou fancies his chances against Gibson-Park, runs over him then Cros and Jelonch add their heft to maul it another five metres. Back to normality as a pod of Marchand, Cros, and Guillard form. Marchand makes the carry. Another pod, this time with Moefana, Bielle-Biarrey, and Aldegheri forms with Moefana carrying. Then it’s a hard line from Jelonch with Cros snatching the ball from his hands and continuing the attack. No bear in mind, Ireland haven’t yet slowed down these attacking phases and are continuously being put on the back foot.

By phase seven, almost the entire French team are within 10m of one another. Narrow intricacy rather than expansive width are the order of the day - like an older school Ireland. Guillard, Jelonch, and Cros combine to get the ball wide and it’s try time except the pass intended for Attissogbe goes to the hands of Prendergast. He’s 7m from his own line but runs into his own dead ball area instead of stopping and trying to carry out. France will score their second try from the ensuing 5m scrum.

Ireland don’t get their hands on the ball, until the end, but the challenge is an inability to actually stop or even slow this French attack. France stay tight and simply run with numerous options. Ireland make the tackles but they are not aggressive enough in their defence which means, at best, the tackle is neutral rather than negative. This was a relentless issue throughout the first half where Ireland were being forced backwards and then France would continue or look for space for their kick.

Moment Three: 25.00 France win turnover ball (Score: 12-0)

Ireland have just lost a contestable kick, another one. France run it back but Beirne, who is single handedly keeping Ireland in the contest, wins the turnover. Ireland carry through Jeremy Loughman but he knocks on. France carry to the edge of the 22m through Dupont and Ramos. Without much on we see essentially a resting attack from France. Some simple pods and Dupont willing to scoot from the base.

Ireland have some success here and knock France back on a couple of carries. But France are slowly building. A strong carry from Depoorteré on the nearside of the pitch is the cue to get things moving. France burst into life and there is a noticeable increase in their urgency. That is curbed by a fumble from Jalibert which forces Attissogbe to sweep up the mess. Theoretically the danger is paused but Dupont then Moefana make two positive carries around the base and Joe McCarthy gives away a lazy penalty by coming in at the side. Ramos kicks it and the three score difference hangs around Ireland’s neck for the rest of the game even when they start to hit their straps.

It’s a big moment though because we see how much pressure France are putting on Ireland even when they aren’t in fifth gear. Just outside of the Irish 22, France know they won’t be kicking this away but the ball has been in play a lot and they need a moment to recharge. So we see Dupont basically put his foot on it and they slowly work their way across the pitch. There’s no urgency until Depoorteré spots Gibson-Park and accelerates into him. Now they’re over the gainline and the urgency ramps up. A lack of accuracy means France don’t immediately score but they build briefly before Ireland hand them three points from a bizarre lack of discipline in an otherwise clean game. But, it also all started from a turnover opportunity Ireland immediately handed back.

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As a fly-half your linebreaks will generally come in the middle of the pitch where you have attackers on both the inside and outside. Therefore being able to animate the ball is a critical skill. Notice how Searle holds the ball in two hands and pushes it forward to really sell the pass. Also notice how he comes around the corner, fixes the wide defender then straightens to beat the inside defender.

Here Nick Tompkins has to scamper across to support his outside defender.

But then Searle straightens up, keeps the ball in two hands, has a runner on his shoulder, and all those things conspire to open up the hole on the inside shoulder of Tompkins.

Notice how this is almost exactly the same play. We are going to see this a lot in the next few years. The hard line with the fly-half running out the back and the blindside winger sweeping with him. We see the same approach from Searle. He bends his run to straighten up the attack and gets the ball in two hands. This time though the Stormers push up on him which is his cue to give the pass - winger or centre it doesn’t really matter the hole has been created by his running prowess.

Here we can see all of the elements we have already talked about tied together. Searle takes the ball and immediately runs that line where he aims for the far sideline. That does two things; it fixes Immanuel Feyi-Waboso (14) who ends up being glued to the spot, secondly it pulls Henry Slade away from his support.

Look at Searle’s body position as he makes the linebreak pass. After making that angled run, he straightens up so his body is facing up the field. It’s very easy for players to not fully straighten up after an angled run like this. If Searle kept drifting here he would simply slingshot Slade into the path of his support runner. Straighten up, animate the ball, and you’ll fix the defender in front of you.

Note how Searle carries the ball in two hands away from his body. That gives him the flexibility to get the pass away to one of the three supporting players or pull it back into his body if the carry is the best option. Of course, this helps if you are going to pass the ball but it also helps if you’re going to carry because it allows Searle to more fully ‘sell’ the dummy.

An area where Searle has improved is with his carrying. With Agen he was a very good distributor but was less often found galloping into open space. For the data nerds his Try Equivalents per 100 Carries last year with Agen was 6.9, it’s 16.8 this year with Leicester. That is partly coming from being given more opportunities to carry but also his ability to shift the ball wide has helped carve out space through the middle.

If you are a young player or you have a young player in your family, Searle is a great person to watch. His key attribute is giving defenders a chance to miss the tackle. Run straight at a defender and if they miss the tackle then it’s entirely on them. That’s hard to watch back during the analysis session. But give them a reason to miss and not look bad and you’ll bag plenty more clean breaks. For Searle, this comes from carrying and animating the ball in two hands. Plus, that angled run when he does have space to run into forces the inside defender to slide across and because he’s agile enough to step back he can also target the soft inside shoulder.

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Last season, Montauban had 2.1pts per 22-entry (the year they escaped the Pro D2) this year (planted to the bottom of the Top 14) it’s 2.1pts per 22-entry. What has changed is the number of entries (per the excellent Oval Insights) from 9.6 last year to 8.2 this year. The points outside the 22 have dropped from 5.7pts to 2.6pts. At the same time they’ve gone from allowing 10.4 22-entries to allowing 12.4. Those sounds like relatively small changes but of course they were small changes to a team whose underlying statistics suggested they were a mid to upper tier Pro D2 side.

For possessions starting in the opposition half, Montauban have converted just 10.2% of them into tries this season, 27th of the 30 teams in the Top 14 this year or Pro D2 last. The problem, it appears, is sadly blindingly obvious. Montauban start games so poorly (their average score at half-time is 9-23). That limits how they can play. That long range kicking game isn’t as effective when you’re chasing a 14pt deficit. Last season it was keeping them in matches but this time around the game has gone before they’ve got going.

In that last article, I said that if Montauban just assumed that they were ‘deserving’ of the Top 14 then they would make the mistake of not sufficiently strengthening and would undergo a miserable and underwhelming season. Now, they haven’t sufficiently strengthened and they are having a miserable season. But, perhaps that doesn’t give them enough credit. Maybe, maybe, they had the foresight to understand the situation they were in. They might have known that the Top 14 was a bridge too far and decided not to stake everything on a single season if that meant long-term financial ruin. Instead, this could be a season of growth. Admittedly, growth which comes after a chastening season, but still growth.

This is a good lesson. Mention of underlying stats might not sound very romantic but it is important. It’s easy to get caught up in the actual results and ignore luck, both good and bad. Do that and you can end up jettisoning a good coach on an unlucky run or keeping a bad coach riding a wave.

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